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Nontechnical Summary 
In an international comparison, German workers have a long seniority and face 
larger problems to find a new job when they are older – the relative unemployment 
rate of people older than 55 is clearly higher in comparison to the average 
unemployment rate than in any other OECD country. Both facts point at a potentially 
important impact of deferred compensation on the employee structure and hiring 
behaviour. Firms that defer compensation pay their older employees with long 
seniority higher wages than their productivity, in exchange of lower wages at the 
beginning of their careers. This provides them with an efficient mechanism to 
motivate and retain their employees. In this paper the deferred wage hypothesis is 
tested indirectly by looking at the employment structure and hiring consequences of 
high seniority wages. Our main assumption is that firms with deferred compensation 
have a relatively steep seniority-wage profile in comparison to their competitors. As 
a consequence, they can keep their employees longer and hire less older unemployed 
(because they are too expensive if they are paid according to the insiders with longer 
tenure but the same age). In order to calculate differences in seniority wages between 
establishments and their consequences on the employment structure and hiring 
behaviour, this paper combines two strains of the literature. The first strain separates 
seniority and job matching wage effects on the basis of individual data, but cannot 
look at employment consequences. The second strain explains the employment 
structure on the basis of establishment data, but cannot properly calculate seniority 
wages. This paper uses linked employer-employee data, aggregates individual 
seniority wages to the establishment level, and correlates them with the 
establishment employment structure. From the individual wage estimations that are 
performed according to the two most influential seniority wage estimation 
approaches, we learn that in an international comparison German firms pay relatively 
high seniority wages. In the estimations on the consequences of seniority wages, it 
finds according to the deferred compensation hypothesis that establishments with 
stronger seniority wages have a higher tenure but hire less older employees. These 
results are obtained by calculating all variables as deviations from sector means. 
These results are taken as evidence that at least some German establishments use 
deferred payments and hereby retain workers but lock out older employees.  
 Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
Im internationalen Vergleich verbleiben deutsche Beschäftigte lange im gleichen 
Betrieb und haben größere Schwierigkeiten eine neue Stelle zu finden, wenn sie älter 
sind. Die Arbeitslosenquote Älterer über 55 Jahre im Vergleich zur durchschnittlichen 
Arbeitslosenquote ist in Deutschland höher als in allen anderen OECD Ländern und das 
Arbeitsvolumen dieser Personengruppe ist vergleichsweise gering. Beide Fakten deuten 
darauf hin, dass Unternehmen ihre älteren und lange im Unternehmen verbliebenen 
Beschäftigten über ihrer Produktivität entlohnen. Im Gegenzug ist die Entlohnung in 
den ersten Beschäftigungsjahren relativ gering. Dieses steile Entlohnungsprofil gibt den 
Unternehmen einen effizienten Mechanismus an die Hand, ihre Beschäftigten an den 
Betrieb zu binden und zu motivieren. In diesem Papier wird die Hypothese, dass 
Betriebe diese steilen Entlohnungsprofile haben, indirekt getestet, indem die 
Konsequenzen der Senioritätsentlohnung auf Beschäftigungsstruktur und 
Einstellungsverhalten untersucht werden. Die Hauptannahme ist hierbei, dass 
Unternehmen mit einem steilerem Lohn-Senioritätsprofil als ihre Mitbewerber ihre 
Beschäftigten relativ lange binden können, jedoch kaum ältere Beschäftigte einstellen 
(weil diese zu teuer sind, falls sie den gleichen Lohn bekommen wie die bereits länger 
im Betrieb Beschäftigten gleichen Alters). Um den Einfluss der Senioritätsentlohnung 
auf die Beschäftigungsstruktur und Einstellungsverhalten zu berechnen, werden zwei 
Literaturstränge miteinander verknüpft. Der erste Strang trennt auf der Basis von 
Individualdaten die Lohneffekte von Seniorität und Selektivität, kann aber die 
Beschäftigungsauswirkungen nicht betrachten. Der zweite Strang erklärt zwar  die 
Beschäftigungsstruktur auf der Basis von Unternehmensdaten, kann aber 
Senioritätslöhne nicht einwandfrei berechnen. In diesem Beitrag werden verknüpfte 
Betriebs- und Beschäftigtendaten genutzt, um individuelle Senioritätslöhne auf 
Unternehmensebene zu aggregieren und anschließend den Zusammenhang mit der 
Beschäftigtenstruktur zu prüfen.  Die Berechnungen zeigen, dass deutsche Unternehmen 
im internationalen Vergleich hohe Senioritätslöhne bezahlen. Die Konsequenzen der 
Senioritätslöhne auf Betriebsebene hingegen zeigen, dass Unternehmen mit stärkerer 
Senioritätsentlohnung ihre Beschäftigten länger binden können, jedoch weniger ältere 
Beschäftigte neu einstellen. Die Schlussfolgerung daraus ist, dass zumindest in einigen 
deutschen Unternehmen steile Lohnprofile ältere Arbeitslose ausgrenzen. 
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Abstract 
This paper combines two strains of the literature on the employment effects of 
deferred compensation. The first strain separates seniority and job matching wage 
effects on the basis of individual data, but cannot look at employment consequences. 
The second strain explains the employment structure on the basis of establishment 
data, but cannot properly calculate seniority wages. This paper uses linked employer-
employee data, aggregates individual seniority wages to the establishment level, and 
correlates them with the establishment employment structure. According to the 
deferred compensation hypothesis this paper finds that establishments with stronger 
seniority wages have a higher tenure but hire less older employees.  
Key-Words: Seniority Wages, Employment Structure, Linked Employer-Employee 
Data 
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1 Introduction 
Unemployment duration, wage loss after unemployment, and the risk to work part-time 
increase and the chances to find a new job decline with age (Farber, 1997; Hirsch et al., 
2000). This phenomenon frequently is associated with wages being higher than the 
value of the workers´ marginal product beyond a certain tenure length. Lazear (1979, 
1981) labels this wage pattern “deferred payment” and explains it by long-term implicit 
contracts that solve the agency problem by shifting compensation to the end of the 
contract. Establishments that use deferred payment should be characterised by a longer 
average tenure of employees and a lower motivation to hire older employees. 
 It is notoriously difficult to measure individual productivity and therefore a 
direct test of the hypothesis that firms defer payments in order to solve their agency 
problem is hard to find.1 The empirical literature on the presence and consequences of 
deferred payment therefore is split into two strains that partly contradict themselves 
(Hutchens, 1989). One strain focuses on the estimation of earnings tenure profiles 
(Topel, 1991; Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Dustmann and Pereira, 2005). These papers 
show that the individual wage (increase) has to be separated into the seniority 
component and the match quality or experience component. This split takes into 
account that employees who fit well into jobs tend to stay longer at the employer. 
Although some of the estimated rather flat earnings tenure profiles cast doubt on the 
empirical relevance of deferred earnings, they do find a large variance of wage profiles 
between individuals. These contributions are based on individual data and therefore do 
not have establishment information that is necessary to detect consequences of 
variations in wage tenure profiles on the establishment employment structure. 
The other strain of empirical papers assumes that deferred earnings exist (in 
certain enterprises or for certain jobs) and tests indirectly if (indicators of) seniority 
wages or other employee and establishment characteristics have consequences for the 
employment opportunities of older employees, retirement rules, and the age structure of 
enterprises (Hutchens, 1986; Hirsch et al., 2000). They are typically based on 
establishment data and use aggregate indicators, such as the average wages of older 
                                                          
1 Among the few direct comparisons between wage and productivity profiles using data from one 
single firm are Medoff and Abraham (1980), Lazear (1999), and Shaw and Lazear (2007).  
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workers versus the aggregate wages of younger workers, or the average wage increase 
between workers aged 30 and workers aged 50. These papers cannot separate seniority 
and selectivity effects in the seniority wage indicators. Therefore the seniority wage 
indicators they use might be biased.  
This paper for the first time combines both literature strains. It first measures 
individual earnings tenure profiles separating them from the selectivity effect. Then the 
individual seniority wages are aggregated to the establishment level. Finally, it is tested 
if differences in the aggregated earnings tenure profiles lead to consequences for the 
establishment employment structure and the chances of older workers to find new jobs. 
According to the deferred wage hypothesis, establishments with higher seniority wage 
should have a higher average tenure because employees are motivated to stay longer in 
the same establishment, while they hire less older employees because they are relatively 
expensive (Hutchens, 1986).  
This empirical approach is only viable since the advent of linked employer-
employee data because these data sets provide the crucial information on the individual 
wage, seniority and experience characteristics of all employees in an establishment 
necessary to calculate individual seniority wages and aggregate them to an indicator of 
seniority wages at the establishment level. In addition, these data give us the 
employment and hiring characteristics at the establishment level needed to test the 
consequences of deferred wage hypothesis. 
This paper has the following structure. The next part explains the theoretical 
notion of deferred payments and its consequences for the employment structure of 
enterprises. It also presents in detail the two different strains of the empirical literature 
tackling this topic so far. The third part explains the empirical estimation strategy and 
the fourth part presents the linked employer employee panel data set used. The fifth part 
contains the empirical analysis on the employment effects of seniority wages and the 
sixth part concludes. 
  
2 Background 
According to Lazear (1979, 1981), employers and employees may enter into implicit 
contracts, whereby workers receive a wage that is less than the value of the worker´s 
marginal product at the beginning of the contract and greater than the value of marginal 
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product at the end. The employees are indifferent to work for an employer with implicit 
contracts or an employer that pays wages equal to the marginal product value if the 
(expected) present value of both paths is equal. The steeper wage path of firms with 
deferred compensation changes the workers´ incentive structure, however. It induces 
them to work harder and remain honest with the firm in order to finally obtain the high 
wage. Workers who shirk or steal run the risk of being caught and fired and forgoing the 
payments that come at the end of the contract. This change in behaviour efficiently 
solves the agency problem and makes more costly alternatives such as efficiency wages 
or control mechanisms redundant. Deferred compensation therefore increases the value 
created over the life cycle and probably also the life time wealth for the employee if the 
employer shares part of the increased value. A strong increase of wages with seniority, 
however, renders older workers costly. The firms pay the high wages for the insiders 
with a long tenure in order to fulfil the implicit contract. They have no motivation to 
hire older workers, however, because their productivity is lower than their wages at 
least if firms do not want to discriminate between workers´ wages on the basis of equity 
considerations. Especially in Germany, works councils and collective bargaining 
contracts support earnings equality for employees with similar observable 
characteristics and in similar tasks and hereby contribute to the relatively small wage 
dispersion (Addison et al., 2006). 
 Delayed payment contracts therefore should induce firms to employ older 
employees but not hire them (Hutchens, 1986). Seniority wages can therefore be 
associated with long job tenures, mandatory retirement rules and a lower willingness of 
establishments to hire older workers. Inspired by the theory of implicit contracts, there 
is a broad empirical literature that tries to find out if wages are indeed deferred, or in 
other words if wages increase stronger with tenure than productivity for those who stay 
with the same employer. An alternative hypothesis is that enterprises pay seniority 
wages purely in order to match increases in productivity stemming from higher 
experience or specific human capital acquired during the job (Carmichael, 1983) or as 
an insurance device (Harris and Holmstrom, 1982). It may be possible that firms 
increase seniority wages according to the productivity increases and nevertheless do not 
hire older employees and have high average employee tenure. This may be the case if 
specific skills are important for productivity in these firms and older employees do not 
have enough time left to acquire these skills gainfully. It may nevertheless be the case 
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however that these establishments pay seniority wages beyond the productivity increase 
in order to attract and keep suitable employees (Carmichel, 1983).  
The empirical literature that tests the deferred wage hypothesis is split into two 
strains so far. The first line of papers focuses on the estimation of individual seniority 
wages and explores whether wages increase with seniority at all (Abraham and Farber, 
1987). These papers stress that workers with comparatively high wages tend to remain 
in their jobs. As the high wages can be paid right since the start of the new job, this self-
selection process induces a positive bias in the measurement of seniority wages. Altonji 
and Shakotko (1987) use the individual variation of tenure over a given job as 
instrumental variable in order to correct for unobserved individual and job 
characteristics that affect wages. The instrumental variable estimator for the impact of 
tenure on wages based on the 1968 – 1981 waves of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics indeed is much lower than the least square estimates and the experience 
slopes are steeper. This leads the authors to the conclusion that general labour market 
experience and job shopping account for the bulk of wage growth over a career. 
Dustmann and Pereira (2005) note that also the experience variables might be 
endogeneous in the wage equation and they accordingly also instrument experience by 
the deviation from the individual experience mean. They find on the basis of the British 
Household Panel Survey and the German Socio-Economic Panel for the period 1991-
1997 that returns to seniority are close to zero in both countries on average. Parent 
(2000) argues that industry-specific capital plays a larger role than tenure in one firm. 
Indeed, re-estimating tenure earnings profiles using the estimation approach by Altonji 
and Shakotko (1987) and additionally controlling for workers who change industry 
when they change jobs, the tenure effect is even further reduced. But since he uses data 
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), his results cannot indicate the tenure earnings profile for older 
workers.  
Topel (1991) chooses an alternative approach measuring wage growth instead of 
wage levels. He separates the tenure and experience effect on wages of those employees 
who stay in the same firm. On the basis of the PSID, he first estimates the joint impact 
of tenure and experience on individual wages and then deducts the impact of initial 
experience on this effect from a second estimation step. Lefranc (2003) argues that 
Topel´s (1991) results might be biased because Topel uses yearly averages of wages 
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instead of hourly wages at the day the other individual characteristics are measured. The 
tenure estimates are indeed smaller for hourly wages than average yearly wages. 
Lefranc (2003) also estimates the returns to seniority for the USA on the basis of the 
PSID for 1981-1992 and for France on the basis of the enquêtes d´emploi for 1990-
1997. Williams (2004) argues that the tenure coefficients in Topel (1991) might be 
biased downwards by job match heterogeneity and biased upwards by individual 
heterogeneity. In order to check the bias due to individual heterogeneity, he instruments 
initial experience in the second estimation step by current individual experience. On the 
basis of the British Household Panel Survey for 1991-1998, he finds that indeed the 
experience effect increases in the instrumental variable version and analogously the 
tenure effect decreases. The impact of seniority on wages found by the papers based on 
Topel´s approach is around one or two percent per year and therefore slightly higher 
than the effect around zero calculated by the authors on the basis of Altonji and 
Shakotko´s approach. 
The papers discussed so far are based on individual data sets without 
establishment characteristics. They therefore cannot calculate the employment 
consequences of seniority wages or compare the steepness of wages and productivity 
over tenure. One approach to directly identify the wage and productivity patterns is to 
use case study data from enterprises in which individual productivity can be measured. 
Medoff and Abraham (1980) present one of the few papers. They find that a worker´s 
subjective performance rating relative to others in a job grade does not increase with 
time in the job grade. Earnings relative to others in the grade tend to increase with time 
in the grade, however. Lazear (1999) and Shaw and Lazear (2007) show that the slope 
of tenure in the earnings regression is steeper than the slope of tenure in the productivity 
regression in a car glass repair enterprise. It remains unclear, however, if these findings 
can be transferred to other firms and sectors.  
Hellerstein et al., (1999) pursue another estimation strategy. In non-linear 
estimations they compare the productivity impact of prime-aged workers with the 
impact of older workers with their differences in relative wages. They use a US linked 
employer-employee data set for 1989 from the Census of Population and the 
Longitudinal Research Database. They find that productivity and earnings rise at the 
same rate over the life cycle for both groups of workers. Hellerstein and Neumark 
(2004) use a similar estimation approach on the basis of the large and representative US 
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1990 Decennial Employer-Employee Dataset. They find that the estimated relative 
wage profile is steeper than the relative productivity profile, consistent with models of 
deferred wages. 
The second strain of the literature indirectly measures deferred compensation by 
looking at the employment consequences of (indicators of) seniority wages. Lazear 
(1979) finds a positive correlation between individual mandatory retirement/pension 
plans and the difference between individual average job wage growth and predicted job 
wage growth. The predicted average job wage growth is derived from a regression 
explaining the difference between the topical wage of older workers and the wage in the 
first full-time job divided by experience. The explanatory variables are individual 
characteristics such as qualification, sex or the age at the first job. Lazear uses 
individual data from the US Longitudinal Retirement History Survey, 1969-71. 
Hutchens (1986) uses the 1970 one-in-100 census file in order to construct slightly less 
than 3000 three-digit industry occupation pairs. According to the theory of deferred 
payment, he finds that industry-occupation pairs that have relatively few recently hired 
workers over age 55 in relation to all workers over age 55 are characterised by pensions, 
mandatory retirement, high tenure and high wages per hour for older employees. Note 
that he cannot exactly measure tenure because changes from one employer to the other 
are only accounted for if the employee changes the industry or the occupation. Hutchens 
(1987) finds some indirect evidence for the hypothesis that firms use deferred payment 
for jobs that cannot easily be monitored. He uses the repetition-of-tasks variable as an 
indicator for the extent to which the technology used in a given job is conducive to 
monitoring worker effort. This variable is not only negatively correlated with the 
probability of pensions and mandatory retirement but also with the length of job tenure 
and the level of wages for older workers. The evidence is based on the 1971 wave of the 
NLS older male data which contains data from almost 3000 workers. Hirsch et al. 
(2000) calculate the impact of wage tilt (the rate of wage growth after controlling for 
other measurable wage determinants) on the age structure. On the basis of various 
micro-level Current Population Survey files and other data sets, they find that 
occupations with steeper wage profiles are less likely to have a high proportion of older 
workers and are less likely to hire older workers. Their measures are all aggregated to 
the occupation level and the tenure earnings function is based on potential experience 
because tenure and experience are unknown. Finally, Daniel and Heywood (2007) use 
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the 1998 UK WERS linked employer employee data set in order to test the seniority 
wage hypothesis on the establishment level. They find that firms that defer 
compensation indeed hire a smaller share of older workers. They do not have direct 
indicators for seniority wages, however, but only know the average wage increase for 
all employees in the establishment. 
 
3 Estimation Strategy 
The strength of deferred wages should affect the employee structure and hiring 
behaviour if indeed the productivity of the employees grows by a lower rate than the 
wages. Our basic assumption is that we can compare the seniority wages within a 
sector.  A steeper seniority wage profile of an establishment than that of the average 
establishment in a sector is interpreted as an indication that this enterprise offers a 
wage-seniority pattern that exceeds productivity growth. More specifically, we test the 
following hypotheses: If an enterprise pays steeper tenure earnings profiles than the 
average enterprise in its sector, this should lead (1) to a higher average tenure of the 
employees and (2) a lower probability of hiring older workers in comparison to the 
average enterprise in the sector (Hutchens, 1986; Hirsch et al., 2000). The impact of 
deferred compensation on the age structure remains unclear (3) because longer seniority 
and a smaller share of older workers hired constitute two countervailing effects whose 
net outcome cannot be predicted theoretically. 
 The basic idea to test the deferred wage hypothesis is to estimate individual 
seniority wages according to the two most influential estimation approaches (Topel, 
1991; Altonji and Shakotko, 1987) in a first step. In a second step the individual 
seniority wages are aggregated to the enterprise level. Finally, the impact of the 
aggregate enterprise seniority wages is estimated on enterprise average tenure, average 
age, and hiring chances of older employees. Here deviations from the sector means are 
used for all variables. 
 As indicated above, Topel (1991) argues that tenure is endogeneous in an 
earnings regression. In order to separate the tenure and the experience effect, first the 
growth of real wages ∆w is estimated for those workers who stay with the same 
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employer by the change in tenure ∆t and experience ∆e (and their squares, triples, and 
quadruples)2: 
  (1) 
From equation (1), the cumulated average wage increase since the present job began is 
calculated for every employee depending on experience and tenure ∆Ω. Please notice 
that we cannot distinguish yet between the tenure and the experience effect but only 
observe their combined linear effect in α1 because both measures increase by one from 
year to year for those who stay in the same firm.  
The average predicted wage increase in the present job – given the current tenure and 
experience – is then deducted from the current wage in order to obtain the predicted 
wage at the beginning of the present job (we have to estimate the initial wage because it 
lies outside of our observation period for employees with longer seniority). The 
calculated wage at the beginning of the topical job t=0 is the endogeneous variable in 
the second equation that is explained by the experience at the beginning of the current 
job e0 and a vector F of further individual and enterprise characteristics: 
 0 0 ´i i i i iw W e Fβ δ ζ− Δ = + +  (2) 
The true seniority wage minus the experience effect is finally calculated by deducting 
the experience effect on the initial wage level β0 in the second equation from the joint 
seniority and experience effect α1. 
The second estimation step might bias the measured tenure effect downwards 
because job matches are heterogeneous and upwards because individuals are 
heterogeneous (Williams, 2004). In order to avoid these biases, Topel (1991) proposes 
to instrument initial experience with current experience in the second stage. In a 
robustness check, initial experience in equation (2) is instrumented accordingly.  
In the next step, the predicted error terms of equation (1) are taken, i.e. the positive 
or negative deviations from the average predicted wage increase liε . Then the individual 
residuals are aggregated to the average residuals on the establishment level  i j
j
ε ∈∑ . 
Then the deviation of the average enterprise residual from the sector and year average is 
calculated. It is therefore possible that if some employees in one enterprise earn more 
and some earn less than the average seniority wage in the sector and year, the aggregate 
                                                          
2 Results are roughly the same if we de-trend wages using year dummies in order to remove the 
2 3 4 2 3 4
1 2 3 4 1 2 3        i i i i i i i i iw t t t t e e eα α α α β β β εΔ = Δ + Δ + Δ + + Δ + Δ + Δ +
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effect is zero. In the final step, the aggregate deviation   i i jj
i
d ε ε ∈= −∑ from the sector 
and year mean is taken as one of the establishment characteristics used to explain the 
establishment employment and hiring structure xj (compare Hutchens, 1986; Hirsch et 
al., 2000):  
 ´j j j jx d Gχ φ ϕ= + + . (3) 
The other covariates are the typically used establishment characteristics to explain the 
employment structure and the hiring strategy of firms: the share of foreigners, the profit 
situation, the presence of a works council, an export dummy and several qualification 
characteristics of the work force. 
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Dustmann and Pereira (2005) assume that the 
worker-firm specific match is time-invariant. They use deviations from the individual 
job means in tenure and experience (and their higher order terms) as instruments in 
order to solve the problem of endogeneity in the earnings equation. In the second 
estimation approach to calculate seniority wages, the individual wage is explained by 
tenure t, and tenure square t2, a dummy old that indicates if the employee works for the 
enterprise longer than one year, experience e and their higher orders as well as 
additional establishment and individual characteristics X: 
 2 2 31 2 3 1 2 3      old  e   ´X  . i i i i i i i i iw t t e eα α α β β β γ ε= + + + + + + +  (4) 
The problem of the endogeneity of tenure in the wage regression is solved in this paper 
following Altonji and Shakotko (1987) by instrumenting t, t2 and old by their deviation 
from the individual means. Dustmann and Pereira (2005) argue that also the experience 
terms should be instrumented by the same internal instruments. In this paper therefore 
equation (4) is calculated by two instrumental variables regression using the deviations 
as instruments for tenure as well as tenure and experience. In order to calculate the 
establishment deviations from the average seniority wages, interaction terms are added 
between the individual tenure term (respectively the instrumented tenure term) and an 
enterprise indicator fj: 
( )2 2 31 2 3 1 2 3      old  e   ´X  . i i i i i i i i j i j iw t t e e t fα α α β β β γ δ ε= + + + + + + + +i (5) 
                                                                                                                                                                          
effects of secular wage growth. 
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An enterprise is labelled now as paying a high seniority wage if the coefficient δj of the 
interaction term is positive and a dummy variable is created accordingly. Please note 
that we need as many interaction terms as enterprises in the data set. 
In the last step, the regressions on the employment structure of the enterprise are 
executed similarly to those in equation (3). Here we explain the employment structure 
and hiring behaviour using the dummy variable for high seniority enterprises derived 
from equation (5) and the same additional establishment characteristics as explanatory 
variables. Again, we use deviations from the year and sector means for all variables 
including the high seniority wage dummy variable.  
 
4 Data 
In order to analyse seniority wages in Germany, this paper uses the waves 1997-2004 of 
the linked employer-employee data set of the Institut für Arbeitsmarkt- und 
Berufsforschung (LIAB). We choose the cross section version of this data set, which 
means that we have one observation per year (on June 30th) for almost all employees in 
the establishments observed (see Alda et al., 2005 for details). On the establishment 
level, the LIAB uses the representative survey data of the IAB establishment panel. This 
panel entails questions on value added, industrial relations, sector, average employee 
characteristics and expectations of the managers. The establishment data are linked with 
a common identifier to the individual information. The individual level uses official 
data of the IAB employment register. Yearly information on individual wages, 
qualification, gender, tenure, experience, and age can therefore be linked to the 
employer data. Altogether we have almost 7 Mio. employees in more than 8,500 
establishments. 
We know individual daily earnings at the survey date. These wages are deflated by 
the official wage inflation data from the Federal Statistical Office. About 8% of the 
observations have censored wages on the social contribution ceiling (only the ceiling 
value is reported in the data set and not the true earnings). Those censored wages are 
multiply imputed (compare Gartner, 2005) by defining 20 cells for different gender, 
qualification (five groups), and nationality. For each cell censored wage Tobit 
regressions are estimated separately including the covariates tenure, tenure square, age, 
sector (16 dummies), an East Germany dummy, and three dummies for the qualification 
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level. Also tenure and experience are censored. For employees in West Germany 
experience and tenure are known since January 1st 1970 and for East Germany since 
January 1st 1990. This means that between 16% (1997) and 7% (2001) of the West 
German and between 46% (1997) and 28% (2001) of the East German employees have 
censored values. We account for censoring by also multiply imputing the censored 
values. The calculated imputed values for wages, experience and tenure might lead to 
excess variance in time differences and therefore only the first imputed value of several 
censored values in a row is taken. For the following values the same (inflation 
corrected) wage is taken instead of a separately calculated imputed wages and for tenure 
and seniority, one year is added to the base value. In order to test the robustness of our 
results, all regressions have also been executed without any observations with censored 
values for wages, tenure, and experience. The results were qualitatively the same and 
led to slightly higher estimated seniority wages (results available on request). 
We only include employees working full time because we do not know the working 
hours of those working part time. In the tradition of Topel (1991) only employees aged 
18-60 are included in order to avoid strong selectivity at the age fringes. We exclude the 
East German employees because their experience and tenure information is heavily 
censored and wage increases are dominated by the quick catch-up process between East 
and West German wages in the 90s. We also exclude employees in public enterprises 
because they received an automatic seniority bonus in the observation period and 
employers were not free to decide on the steepness of the seniority bonus. Apprentices 
are excluded because they have a strong wage increase after completing their 
apprenticeship. Finally, employees whose wages increased or decreased by more than 
200% from year to year are excluded. 
 
5 The Impact of Seniority Wages on the Employment Structure of 
Firms 
First the seniority wages are calculated analogously to the approaches by Topel (1991) 
and Altonji and Shakotko (1987). This allows us to compare the results with those 
obtained in papers using the same estimation techniques for different countries or using 
other German data and observation periods. The average tenure/experience effect of an 
additional year at the same employer calculated according to equation (1) is about 11% 
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in Germany (compare Table 1). This effect lies between that calculated by Lefranc 
(2003) for the USA (about 12% for 1981-1992) and France (about 5% for 1990-1997).3 
The effect of initial experience on the initial wage according to equation (2) is about 6% 
(see Table 2). This means that initial experience accounts for about half of the seniority 
wage effect. This share of selectivity on seniority wages is comparable to that found by 
Lefranc (2003) for France but smaller than that for the USA. After deducting the 
selectivity effect from the total effect, we obtain a seniority wage effect per annum of 
about 4%.  This effect is higher in Germany than in comparable estimations for France 
or the USA – here seniority wages are measured at around 1-2% (Lefranc, 2003), see 
the lower part of Table 2 for the estimated cumulative returns to job tenure or appendix 
figure 1 which also includes results for the UK derived from Williamson (2004).  
If we instrument the initial experience variable by current experience, this 
reduces the estimated initial experience coefficient β0 from about 6% to about 4% in 
equation (2), but has no impact on the relative seniority measures from estimation step 
one. The LIAB entails tenure and experience, but not the sector of the previous 
employer and therefore we cannot include industry experience as an additional 
covariate (Parent, 2000; Dustmann and Meghir, 2005).  
 The OLS earnings estimation analogous to Altonji and Shakotko (1987) leads to 
comparably low and concave seniority wages, a high impact of the first year dummy 
and significantly positive experience terms in Germany (compare Table 3). The tenure 
coefficients decrease if they are instrumented, while the experience terms increase 
(IVten). This is also found by Altonji and Shakotko (1987). If we additionally take 
endogeneity of experience into account by instrumenting the experience terms 
(IVtenexp, compare Dustmann and Pereira, 2005), the tenure effect stays insignificant 
while the experience coefficients decrease (according to the findings in the previous 
literature). Table 4 shows that considering the impact of tenure on wages for all workers 
lead to a much smaller impact of tenure on wages than looking at wage increases of 
stayers (compare Table 2). The tenure impact estimated for the period 1998-2003 on the 
basis of the LIAB is again slightly higher than that calculated by Dustmann and Pereira 
                                                          
3 The results derived by Topel (1991) for the USA 1968-1983 are not comparable because he uses 
average hourly wages instead of the exact hourly wages at the estimation point in time. Lefranc (2003) 
also demonstrates that the estimation period plays a pervasive role in the calculations (repeating the 
estimation by Topel for the period 1981-1992 reduces the average coefficient from about 12% to 4%). 
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(2005) for Germany 1991-1997 and by Altonji and Shakotko (1987) for the USA (see 
Table 4).4 
 Seniority wages are therefore clearly over-estimated if we do not take selectivity 
into account. It also seems that wages increase with seniority in Germany and that this 
increase is at least not lower than in the USA, UK or France. This corresponds with 
what the OECD (2005) concludes on the basis of cross section analyses without taking 
selectivity issues into account. The differences between the countries might be due to 
differences in the data or the observation period and therefore should not be 
overstressed. Taken at face value the stronger seniority wages in the international 
comparisons should lead to relatively long average establishment tenure and less 
opportunities for older unemployed to find new jobs in Germany. This is what we 
indeed find: average seniority in Germany is comparable with that in Western European 
continental countries but higher than in UK, Scandinavian countries and most countries 
in Eastern Europe (OECD, 2008). The relation between the unemployment rate of older 
people aged between 50-64 in comparison to the average unemployment rate is the 
highest of all OECD countries. In 2006, the German ratio was more than 1.2 and about 
0.7 on the OECD average – the only other OECD country with a ratio above 1 was the 
Netherlands (OECD, 2008). In addition, the relative labour volume of older employees 
in Germany is low in an international comparison (Schief, 2006). These descriptive 
statistics provide first evidence that relatively steep seniority wages lead to a relatively 
strong reaction of establishments with respect to their employee structure and hiring 
behaviour.  
 It may well be that not all establishments use deferred payments and therefore 
we should allow for variation in the wage-seniority profile across establishments 
(Hutchens, 1986) instead of looking at averages. A much stronger test of the deferred 
wage hypothesis therefore is if establishments in the same sector with different seniority 
wages also differ with respect to their employment structure and hiring behaviour. In 
the next step therefore the residuals from the individual wage equation (1) are 
aggregated to the establishment level and then deviations from the sector and year 
                                                          
4 Please note that Dustmann and Pereira (2005) use a slightly different estimation specification than 
Altonji and Shakotko (1987). If we replicate their IVtenexp specification, the cumulative returns to 
tenure are: 0.06 (5 years), 0.07 (10 years), 0.05 (15 years), 0.03 (20 years) and therefore slightly lower 
than those according to the Altonji and Shakotko specification and even decreasing like in the Dustmann 
and Pereira specification. 
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means are constructed. This indicator has mean zero and variance 0.02. It is used as a 
covariate together with five qualification share indicators, an export dummy, the share 
of foreigners in the firm and dummies indicating if there is a works council or if the 
establishment is profitable. These variables are all taken as deviations from the sector 
and year means. After aggregating the error terms in equation (1) to the sector means, it 
becomes obvious that the investment and consumption goods sector, the banking and 
insurance industry, and the rest category “other services” (for example personal 
services) pay higher seniority wages than the other sectors. Especially low seniority 
wages are paid in the sectors agriculture and forestry, hospitality, and education and 
training. 
An OLS regression then explains the employee structure and hiring behaviour of the 
establishments (compare Table 5). The coefficients of the seniority wage variable 
confirm the hypotheses: higher seniority wages have a significant positive impact on 
average tenure and a significant negative impact on the share of newly hired old 
employees on all older employees and of the share of newly hire old employees on all 
newly hired employees. Obviously both countervailing effects (longer seniority vs. less 
older employees hired) have a similar strength because seniority wages have no impact 
on the average age and the share of employees aged fifty years or older. By using a 
cluster command, it is taken into account that several observations might stem from the 
same firm but from different years. In order to control that the pooling of observations 
from different years in this estimation step is innocuous, the regressions are re-
calculated using only observations from the year 2001. This leads qualitatively to the 
same results (not shown here). The estimations explaining the employment structure 
and the hiring strategy are partly not very well determined, the other covariates show 
plausible signs, however. 
In the second part of the approach based on Altonji and Shakotko, the OLS 
regression according to equation (5) is estimated including interaction dummies for 
individual tenure and the about 3000 establishments the employees worked in 2001.5 
Then a new dummy variable which equals one if the tenure/establishment interaction 
term is larger than zero or in other words the establishment has a higher seniority wage 
than the average establishment is created. This procedure is repeated using the 
                                                          
5 We have to exclude the observations from the other years because memory constraints do not allow 
us to run the regression with more than 6000 establishment interaction terms. 
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instrumental variable regression including interaction terms between the instrumented 
tenure and the establishment identifiers. In the OLS regression around 52% of the 
establishments are marked as high seniority enterprises and in the IV regression 44%. If 
we compare the establishments marked as paying relatively high seniority wages, 62% 
are marked the same in both estimation approaches. If we look at the shares of 
enterprises with more than average seniority wage payments by sector, we get the same 
three sectors with more than average shares and the three sectors with below than 
average shares as in the previous approach.  
In a last step, the employment structure and hiring behaviour is explained using the 
seniority wage dummy derived from equation (5) and the other establishment 
characteristics (see Table 6). Again all variables are taken as deviations from sector 
means. Also these regressions show that a high seniority wage has a positive impact on 
the average employee tenure and a negative impact on the openness of the enterprise 
towards hiring older workers. A higher seniority wage does not affect the average age 
of the employees and the share of employees aged fifty of more. The other covariates 
have roughly the same impact on employment structure and hiring strategy and a 
comparable R2 to the estimations on the basis of wage differences (compare Table 5). 
These findings might be interpreted as support of the hypothesis that enterprises with 
high seniority wages defer payments and therefore pay higher wages for older 
employees than their productivity. 
 
6 Conclusions 
German establishments that pay a higher seniority wage than the average establishment 
in their sector can retain their employees longer than the average establishment. These 
establishments also hire less employees aged fifty or older (in relation to the number of 
employees aged fifty or the number of new hires with a seniority of less than five 
years). Seniority wages do not have an impact on the average employee age and the 
share of employees aged fifty or above, however, because both effects – longer seniority 
and less older employees hired – seem to cancel themselves out. This means that 
German establishments use deferred payments as an efficient device to retain and 
motivate their employees. As older newly hired workers are too expensive in these 
establishments, this practice may be one reason why older unemployed in Germany face 
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bigger problems to get a new job than older unemployed in almost all other developed 
countries. This argument is supported by our findings that in international comparisons, 
German enterprises pay relatively high seniority wages on average.  
The high seniority wages in Germany are not a consequence of institutional rules 
but paid voluntarily by the establishments because there are no binding clauses for 
example in collective bargaining contracts that force enterprises to increase wages with 
seniority (Bispinck, 2006). The pattern observed may be a consequence of deferred 
compensation which implies that earnings increase stronger than productivity. It may 
also stem from human capital improvements – training or learning on the job leads to 
higher productivity with increasing seniority. In these enterprises it may in addition not 
be worthwhile to hire older employees because they do not have enough tenure left to 
reap their full productivity after a lengthy training-on-the-job period. This explanation 
does not rule out, however, that the earnings pattern is steeper than the productivity 
pattern in these enterprises (Carmichael, 1983). In order to separate both explanations 
empirically, it would be necessary to test if enterprises with strong seniority payments 
also pay more than proportionate retirement payments when employees leave the 
enterprise before the official retirement age (Lazear, 1979). Another option is to relate 
seniority wages to employee supervision costs (Hutchens, 1987). Both options are not 
viable with our data set, however, because we cannot observe retirement payments or 
control costs. This question therefore has to be left to future research. 
. 
Literature 
Abraham, Katherine und Henry Farber (1987): Job Duration, Seniority, and Earnings, 
American Economic Review 77 (3): 278-297. 
Addison, John, Paulino Teixeira, and Thomas Zwick (2006): German Works Councils 
and the Anatomy of Wages, ZEW Discussion Paper 06-034, Mannheim. 
Alda, Holger, Stefan Bender, and Hermann Gartner (2005): The linked employer-
employee dataset of the IAB (LIAB), IAB Discussion Paper 06/2005, Nuremberg. 
Altonji, Joseph and Robert Shakotko (1987): Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority? 
Review of Economic Studies 54, 437-459. 
Bispinck, Benedikt (2006): Senioritätsregeln in Tarifverträgen, in: Deutsches Zentrum 
für Altersfragen (ed.): Beschäftigungssituation älterer Arbeitnehmer, Berlin: 129 - 
200.  
 19
Buhai, Sebastian, Miguel Portela, Coen Teulings und Aico van Vuuren (2007): Returns 
to Seniority: Time or Rank?, mimeo Tinbergen Institute, Rotterdam. 
Carmichael, Lorne (1983): Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders, Bell 
Journal of Economics 14: 251-258. 
Daniel, Kirsten und John Heywood (2007): The Determinants of Hiring Older Workers: 
UK Evidence, Labour Economics 14 (1): 35-51. 
Dustmann, Christian and Costas Meghir (2005): Wages, Experience and Seniority, 
Review of Economic Studies, 72 (1): 77-108  
Dustmann, Christian and Sonia Pereira (2005): Wage Growth and Job Mobility in the 
UK and Germany, IZA Discussion Paper 1586, Bonn. 
Farber, Henry (1997): The Changing Face of Job Loss in the United States, 1981-1995, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity: Microeconomics, 55-128. 
Gartner, Hermann (2005): The imputation of wages above the contribution limit with 
the German IAB employment sample, FDZ Methodenreport Nr. 02/2005, 
Nuremberg. 
Harris, Milton and Bengt Holmstrom (1982): A Theory of Wage Dynamics, Review of 
Economic Studies 49 (3): 315-353. 
Hellerstein, J., D. Neumark, and K. Troske (1999): Wages, productivity, and worker 
characteristics: evidence from plant-level production functions and wage equations, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 17 (3): 409-446. 
Hellerstein, J. and D. Neumark (2004): Production function and wage equation 
estimation with heterogenous labor: evidence from a new matched employer 
employee data set, NBER Working Paper 10325, Cambridge, Mass.. 
Hirsch, Barry, David Macpherson, and Melissa Hardy (2000): Occupational Age 
Structure and Access for Older Workers, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 51: 
401-418. 
Hutchens, Robert (1986): Delayed Payment Contracts and a Firm´s Propensity to Hire 
Older Workers, Journal of Labor Economics 4 (4): 439-457. 
Hutchens, Robert (1987): A Test of Lazear´s Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts, 
Journal of Labor Economics 5 (4): 153-170. 
Hutchens, Robert (1989): Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4): 49-64. 
 20
Lazear, Edward (1979): Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political 
Economy 87: 1261-1284. 
Lazear, Edward (1981): Agency, earnings profiles productivity and hours restrictions, 
American Economic Review 71: 606-620. 
Lazear, Edward (1999): Personnel Economics: Past Lessons and Future Directions, 
Journal of Labor Economics 17 (2): 199-236. 
Lefranc, Arnaud (2003): Labor Market Dynamics and Wage Losses of Displaced 
Workers in France and the United-States, William Davidson Institute Working Paper 
614. 
Medoff, James, and Katherine Abraham (1980): Experience, Performance and Earnings, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 95: 703-736. 
OECD (2005): Ageing and Employment Policies – Germany, Paris. 
OECD (2008): SourceOECD, Paris. (http://stats.oecd.org/) 
Parent, Daniel (2000): Industry-Specific Capital and the Wage Profile: Evidence from 
the NLSY and PSID, Journal of Labor Economics 13 (4): 653 – 677. 
Schief, Sebastian (2006): Beschäftigungsquoten, Arbeitszeiten und Arbeitsvolumina in 
der Europäischen Union, der Schweiz und Norwegen, in: Deutsches Zentrum für 
Altersfragen (ed.): Beschäftigungssituation älterer Arbeitnehmer, Berlin: 53 – 92. 
Shaw, Kathryn and Edward Lazear (2007): Tenure and Output, NBER working paper 
13652, Cambridge, MA. 
Topel, Robert (1991): Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job 
Seniority, Journal of Political Economy 99 (1): 145-176. 
Williams, Nicolas (2004): Seniority, Experience, and Wages in the UK, mimeo 
University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 21
Table 1: Yearly wage growth for employees staying in the establishment, 
dependent variable: ln(yearly real wage change), West-German males 
 All  Men  
  Coef.   
Std. 
Dev.  Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Δ experience and seniority  0.115*** 0.001 0.116 *** 0.001
Δ seniority2*100  -0.218*** 0.003 -0.217 *** 0.003
Δ seniority3*1000  0.081*** 0.001 0.080 *** 0.001
Δ seniority4*10000  -0.010*** 0.000 -0.009 *** 0.000
Δ experience2*100  -0.621*** 0.006 -0.596 *** 0.008
Δ experience3*1000  0.211*** 0.002 0.196 *** 0.003
Δ experience4*10000  -0.027*** 0.000 -0.024 *** 0.000
Number of observations  5305623 3980980 
R2  0.02 0.02 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
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Table 2: Explanation of job entry wages, dependent variable: estimated real wage 
at tenure = 0, West German males 
 All Men 
  Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Experience at job start 0.056*** 0.000 0.061 *** 0.061
Secondary education without professional 
degree  -0.040*** 0.001 -0.056 *** -0.056
Secondary education with professional 
degree  -0.068*** 0.001 0.041 *** 0.041
Tertiary education with professional degree 0.295*** 0.000 0.294 *** 0.294
University of Applied Sciences  0.504*** 0.002 0.482 *** 0.482
University  0.656*** 0.001 0.632 *** 0.632
Foreigner  0.005*** 0.001 0.009 *** 0.009
Dummy 1999  0.027*** 0.001 0.026 *** 0.028
Dummy 2000  0.029*** 0.001 0.029 *** 0.026
Dummy 2001  0.038*** 0.001 0.038 *** 0.017
Dummy 2002  0.064*** 0.001 0.059 *** 0.004
Dummy 2003 0.112*** 0.001 0.106 *** 0.001
Constant  3.206*** 0.001 3.149 *** 3.203
Number of observations  4809951 3706202 
R
2
  0.34 0.39 
Estimated Cumulative Return to Job Tenure for Men 
 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 
West Germany 1998-2003 0.23 0.40 0.56 0.73 
Topel (1991) for USA 1968-1983 0.18 0.25 0.28 0.34 
Lefranc (2003) for USA 1981-1992 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.19 
Lefranc (2003) for France 1990-1997 0.08 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
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Table 3: Explanation of log wages, West German males 
 OLS regression 
Instrumental variables 
regression IVten1 
 Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Seniority  
Seniority squared 
0.007
-0.001
***
***
0.001
0.000
0.003 
-0.000  
0.003
0.000
More than one year of seniority 0.103*** 0.006 0.047 *** 0.003
Experience in years 0.064*** 0.002 0.070 *** 0.002
Experience squared -0.028*** 0.001 -0.030 *** 0.001
Experience tripled 0.004*** 0.000 0.005 *** 0.000
Secondary education without professional 
degree  -0.116*** 0.018 -0.107 *** 0.017
Secondary education with professional 
degree  0.094*** 0.017 0.104 *** 0.017
Tertiary education with professional degree 0.352*** 0.015 0.360 *** 0.016
University of Applied Sciences  0.551*** 0.018 0.554 *** 0.018
University  0.677*** 0.018 0.678 *** 0.018
Foreigner  -0.002  0.007 0.000  0.007
Dummy 1999  0.018*** 0.003 0.017 *** 0.003
Dummy 2000  -0.027*** 0.004 -0.028 *** 0.004
Dummy 2001  -0.007  0.006 -0.010 ** 0.005
Dummy 2002  -0.011  0.007 -0.013 ** 0.005
Constant  3.90*** 0.020 3.926 *** 0.019
Number of observations  5224266 5224266 
R
2
  0.45 0.45 
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Table 3 continued 
 
 
Instrumental variables regression 
IVtenexp2 
  Coef.  Std. Dev.
Seniority 
Seniority squared 
-0.001
0.000  
0.002
0.000
More than one year of seniority 0.054*** 0.005
Experience in years 0.041** 0.021
Experience squared -0.005  0.018
Experience tripled -0.000  0.003
Secondary education without professional degree -0.116*** 0.022
Secondary education with professional degree  0.101*** 0.019
Tertiary education with professional degree  0.386*** 0.027
University of Applied Sciences  0.555*** 0.018
University  0.697*** 0.027
Foreigner  0.014  0.017
Dummy 1999  0.012  0.016
Dummy 2000  -0.037*** 0.014
Dummy 2001  -0.020** 0.009
Dummy 2002  -0.023*** 0.004
Constant  3.951*** 0.029
Number of observations  5224266 
R
2
  0.42 
Notes: 1 IVten - instrumented: tenure, tenure square, more than one year of tenure, 2 
IVtenexp - instrumented: tenure, tenure squared, more than one year of tenure, 
experience, experience squared, experience tripled. 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
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Table 4: Cumulative returns to seniority 
 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 
West Germany 1998 – 2003 IVten 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.10 
West Germany 1998 – 2003 IVtenexp 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Dustmann and Pereira (2005) for West 
Germany 1991 - 1997 IVten 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.06 
Dustmann and Pereira (2005) for West 
Germany 1991 - 1997 IVtenexp -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) for USA 
1968 - 1981 IVten 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 
 
Table 5: Empirical consequences of deferred payments – wage differences, West 
German males 
 Average employee age Share employees 50+ 
  Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Seniority wage -0.375  1.492 0.007  0.041
Share secondary education without 
prof. qual. 1.037*** 0.348 0.040 *** 0.011
Share secondary education with prof. 
qual. -0.331  0.265 0.018 ** 0.008
Share tertiary education with prof. 
qual. -3.445*** 0.776 -0.123 *** 0.021
Share polytechnics 5.488*** 0.879 0.129 *** 0.037
Share university 2.556*** 0.596 0.061 *** 0.019
Share foreigner -1.468*** 0.519 0.004  0.016
Works council  2.232*** 0.129 0.055 *** 0.004
Export dummy  0.438*** 0.146 -0.006  0.005
Profit situation -1.369*** 0.150 -0.035 *** 0.004
Number of Observations  27362 27362 
R
2
  0.09 0.06 
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Table 5 continued 
 
Average Seniority  
 
New employees 50+/ 
employees 50+ 
  Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Seniority wage  6.647*** 1.350 -0.115 *** 0.022
Share secondary education without 
professional qualification 3.126*** 0.288 -0.015 *** 0.008
Share secondary education with prof. qual. 3.760*** 0.195 -0.027 *** 0.006
Share tertiary education with prof. qual. 0.602  0.526 -0.058  0.013
Share polytechnics 2.300*** 0.724 0.011  0.019
Share university 1.397*** 0.513 -0.015  0.011
Share foreigner -2.913*** 0.416 0.013  0.011
Works council  1.640*** 0.130 0.001  0.002
Export dummy  0.594*** 0.158 -0.008 *** 0.003
Profit situation  -1.062*** 0.151 -0.005 * 0.003
Number of Observations  27362 27362 
R2 0.19 0.05 
 New employees 50+/all new hires  
  Coef.  Std. Dev.
Seniority wage  -0.128 *** 0.032
Share secondary education without prof. qual. 0.000  0.008
Share secondary education with prof. qual. -0.013 ** 0.006
Share tertiary education with prof. qual. -0.054 *** 0.020
Share polytechnics 0.014  0.020
Share university -0.011  0.013
Share foreigner -0.015  0.011
Works council  0.004  0.003
Export dummy  -0.008 ** 0.004
Profit situation  -0.016 *** 0.003
Number of Observations  25311 
R2 0.03 
Comments: OLS regressions clustered by establishment number. Regressions include a 
constant, year dummies, five firm size dummies, and 16 sector dummies. 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
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Table 6: Empirical consequences of deferred payments – wage levels, West 
German males 
 Average employee age Share employees 50+ 
  Coef.  Std. Dev. Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Dummy strong seniority wage  0.010  0.132 -0.001  0.003
Share secondary education without 
prof. qual. 0.568  0.450 0.019 * 0.011
Share secondary education with prof. 
qual. 1.131*** 0.339 0.023 *** 0.008
Share tertiary education with prof. 
qual. -0.222  1.012 -0.057 *** 0.018
Share polytechnics 4.298*** 0.851 0.086 *** 0.028
Share university 3.011*** 0.612 0.024 * 0.014
Share foreigner -3.178*** 0.637 -0.019  0.014
Works council  1.931*** 0.158 0.047 *** 0.004
Export dummy  0.235  0.155 0.004  0.004
Profit situation -0.611*** 0.160 -0.011 *** 0.004
Number of Observations  6169 6169 
R
2
  0.08 0.06 
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Table 6 continued 
 
Average Seniority  
 
New employees 
50+/Number 
employees 50+ 
  Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. Coef.  
Std. 
Dev. 
Dummy strong seniority wage  0.639*** 0.123 -0.012 *** 0.002
Share secondary education without prof. 
qual. 2.359*** 0.544 -0.013 * 0.008
Share secondary education with prof. qual. 4.652*** 0.407 -0.013 ** 0.006
Share tertiary education with prof. qual. 0.914  1.344 -0.035 *** 0.012
Share polytechnics 1.256  1.131 -0.001  0.011
Share university 2.633*** 0.729 -0.024 ** 0.008
Share foreigner -2.002*** 0.755 -0.004  0.010
Works council  2.103*** 0.185 0.002  0.003
Export dummy  0.445** 0.213 -0.004  0.003
Profit situation -0.694*** 0.149 -0.000  0.003
Number of Observations  6169 6169 
R2 0.18 0.06 
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Table 6 continued 
 
 New employees 50+/All new hired  
  Coef.  Std. Dev.
Dummy strong seniority wage  -0.008 * 0.004
Share secondary education without prof. qual. -0.010  0.014
Share secondary education with prof. qual. -0.216  0.043
Share tertiary education with prof. qual. -0.184  0.101
Share polytechnics -0.081  0.104
Share university -0.259  0.070
Share foreigner -0.045 ** 0.020
Works council  0.017 *** 0.006
Export dummy  -0.006  0.006
Profit situation -0.009 * 0.006
Number of Observations  5819 
R2 0.03 
Comments: OLS regression with heterogeneity robust variances. Regressions include 16 
sector dummies and four firm size dummies. 
Source: LIAB Cross Section Version, Waves 1998-2004 
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Appendix Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables used 
Variable  
Average 
Value Description 
Seniority  11.08 Years of seniority, imputed 
Experience 16.54 Years of experience, imputed 
Experience at job start 5.90 
Years of experience in current job at 
seniority equals zero 
More than one year of seniority 0.90 
Dummy, 1=seniority longer than 1 year, 
0=otherwise 
Wage 4.56 log wage, imputed 
Secondary education without prof. 
qual. 0.16 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
secondary education without professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Secondary education with prof. qual. 0.62 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
secondary education with professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Tertiary education without prof. qual. 
(reference) 0.01 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
tertiary education without professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Tertiary education with prof. qual. 0.05 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
tertiary education with professional 
qualification, 0=otherwise 
Polytechnics 0.05 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
university of applied sciences, 
0=otherwise 
University 0.07 
Dummy, 1=highest school education 
university, 0=otherwise 
Foreigner 0.10 Dummy, 1=foreigner, 0=German 
Works council  0.91 
Dummy, 1= works council present, 
0=otherwise 
Export dummy  0.41 Dummy, 1=exporter, 0=otherwise 
Profit situation 0.28 
Dummy, 1=profit situation better than at 
competitors, 0=otherwise 
Average employee age 40.31 Average age of employees  
Share employees 50+ 0.21 Dummy,1=older than 50, 0=otherwise 
New employees50+/employees50+ 0.04 
Number of employees with less than 5 
years of seniority who have been hired 
after the age of 50 divided by employees 
older than 50 
New employees 50+/all new hires 0.28 
Number of employees with less than 5 
years of seniority who have been hired 
after the age of 50 divided by employees 
with less than 5 years of seniority 
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Appendix Figure 1: International comparison of seniority wages 
 
